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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007/2008 AND ITS MACRO-
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
 
J. E. Stiglitz 
 
Information and incentive problems played important roles in the financial market 
scandals of the late 90s (exemplified by Enron/Worldcom) and in the financial crisis of 
2007/2008. In my book Roaring Nineties, I provide an interpretation of the market 
scandals of the late nineties and early years of this century.  Here, I want to provide a 
similar interpretation of the 2007/2008 crisis and a critique of the policy responses.  The 
analysis here is motivated in part by observations of a large number of banking crises, 
especially in developing countries.  In many ways, this financial crisis has similarities to 
these earlier crises, though certain aspects of the resolution are markedly different.   
 
THE SOURCES OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Some of the same problems that had contributed to the earlier problems were at play here.  
There were incentives for providing misleading information and conflicts of interest.  
Two additional elements were present:  incentives for excessive risk taking and 
fraudulent behavior (a problem that played an important role in the S & L debacle). 
Perhaps more important though than these perverse incentives was a failure in modeling:   
a failure to understand the economics of securitization, a failure to understand systemic 




 Executive compensation systems  
 
Executive compensation schemes (combined with bank accounting regulations) 
encouraged the provision of misleading information—booking income “above the line,” 
while retaining liabilities off the balance sheet.  Executives that are paid with stock 
options have an incentive to increase the market value of shares, and this may be more 
easily done by increasing reported income than by increasing true profits.  Though 
Sarbanes-Oxley fixed some of the problems that were uncovered in the Enron and related 
scandals, it did nothing about stock options.  With stock options not being expensed, 
shareholders often were not fully apprised of their cost.  This provides strong incentives 
to pay exorbitant compensation through stock options.  But the use of stock options 
encourages bad accounting practices. 
 
In addition, stock options—where executives only participate in the gains, but not the 
losses—and even more so, analogous bonus schemes prevalent in financial markets, 
provide strong incentives for excessive risk taking.  These might garner more profits in 
the short term, thereby increases compensation; but subsequent losses were borne by 
others.  In a sense, they were designed to encourage risk taking.  The problem is that they 
encouraged excessive risk taking.   
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Accounting frameworks exacerbated these problems.  Banks could record profits today 
(and executive enjoy compensation related to those profits), but the potential liabilities 
were placed off the balance sheet.1 
 
Incentives for accounting firms 
 
The Enron/Worldcom scandal brought to the fore long recognized incentive problems 
with accounting (auditing) firms, and their clear conflicts of interest.  Hired by the 
CEO’s, and with much of their pay related to consulting services, they had an incentive to 
please the CEO’s—to improve accounts that overstated profits, which led to higher share 
value, and greater CEO compensation.  Sarbanes Oxley took important steps to improve 
matters—the accounting firms were limited in providing non-accounting services, and 
they were hired by the audit committees of corporate boards.  Yet, few thought that this 
would fully resolve the problems.  Boards, including audit committees, are still often 
beholden to the CEO, and typically see the world through lens provided by the CEO.  
Accounting firms still have an incentive to please the CEO and the companies that hire 
them.   
 
This may provide part of the reason that the accounting firms did not do the job that one 






Recent years have seen increasing reliance on markets, including securitization, and a 
decreasing reliance on banks for the provision of credit.  Much of the attention has 
focused on the greater ability of markets to diversify risk.  Some have argued that 
markets, by gathering information from more diversified sources, may be informationally 
more efficient.  But more than fifteen years ago,2 we questioned this move to move to 
securitization, and in some ways was is remarkably prescient concerning financial crisis 
of 2007-2008.  Securitization creates new information asymmetries—banks have an 
incentive to make sure that those to whom they issue mortgages can repay them, and to 
monitor behavior to make sure that they do (or that the probability that they do is high.)  
Under securitization, the originator only has an incentive to produce pieces of paper that 
it can pass off to others.   
 
(At the time, I did not emphasize enough another problem with securitization—it may 
make renegotiation more difficult, when problems arise.  It is impossible to anticipate 
fully all contingencies, and to specify what is to be done in each in the loan contract.  
                                                 
1 All of this discussion emphasizes the importance of problems of corporate governance, the distinction 
between management (control) and ownership, to which the economics of information called attention.   
 
2 J. E. Stiglitz,  “Banks versus Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment,” in 
J.A. Roumasset and S. Barr (eds.), The Economics of Cooperation: East Asian Development and the Case 
for Pro-Market Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) 15-38 
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When the borrower cannot meet his repayments, it may be mutually beneficial to 
renegotiate—the costs are lower than default (foreclosure on a mortgage).  Yet such 
renegotiation may be more difficult under securitization, when there are many creditors, 
whose interests and beliefs differ. Some may believe that by bargaining hard, they can get 
more on average, even if it means that some of the loans will fall into default.   This is 
especially the case when those who assume the risk do not trust fully those who manage 
the loan to act in their behalf; they may worry that their incentives (related to 
management fees) are not fully in accord with the creditors’, and so may impose 
restrictions on renegotiations.  Moreover, the banks may have a richer “information” 
context with which to evaluate the problems; they can more easily ascertain whether the 
default is a “strategic default” (where the borrower is simply trying to have his debt 
burden reduced), and whether a loan restructuring—deferring repayments—will allow the 
borrower eventually to repay, or whether it will simply mean that the cumulative loss will 
be greater.   Especially in the litigious American context, renegotiation has proven 
difficult, because any creditor has an incentive to sue those responsible for renegotiating 
saying they could have done a better job.)   
 
The securitization of the sub-prime mortgages has actually created a series of new 
problems in information asymmetries:  the mortgages were bought by investment banks, 
repackaged, with parts sold of to other investment banks and to pension funds and others; 
part retained on their own balance sheet.  In retrospect, it was clear that not even those 
creating the products were fully aware of the risks.  But the complexity of the products 
made it increasingly difficult for those at each successive stage of the processing and 
reprocessing to evaluate what was going on.   
 
Rating agency incentives 
 
The rating agencies had been widely berated for their failures in the 1997 global financial 
crisis.  They had underrated the risks in East Asia; but as they became so large that they 
could no longer be ignored, their sudden downgrading of these assets forced them to be 
sold by pension funds and other fiduciaries, and exacerbated the problem.  They had 
clearly contributed to financial market instability.  It seemed strange, given this record, 
that Basle II put such stress on rating agencies3.  In the 2007/2008 subprime mortgage 
crisis, the rating agencies again failed—and are, in my judgment correctly, viewed as a 
critical part of the problem.   
 
Part of the problem is again flawed incentives:  Rating agencies—paid by those who they 
were rating—had an incentive to give them “good grades.”4  They had an incentive to 
believe in the ability of the investment banks to engage in financial alchemy, to convert F 
                                                 
3 Though this is no longer the case in the Internal Ratings Based approach adopted by the U.S. 
4 One might argue that this would have been offset by their desire to maintain their reputation.  The short 
term focus we have emphasized that follows from the market imperfections to which we have called 
attention meant that the concern for loss of reputation may not have been given the weight that it otherwise 
would.  Moreover, when all are engaging in similar practices, there is little risk:  where else can they turn.  
In effect, they are rewarded, and punished, on the basis of relative performance.  (See Nalebuff and Stigltiz, 
1983a, b) 
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rated assets into the kinds of A rated products that fiduciaries could hold in their 
portfolios.  Not unlike medieval alchemists who believed there was money to be made by 
converting base metals like lead into gold, there was plenty of money to be made—and 
shared by all involved in the process—in the conversion of these assets. 
 
 
New conflicts of interest:  repeal of Glass Steagall 
 
During the discussion of the repeal, critics had worried about conflicts of interest.  
Advocates had said, “Trust us.”  Besides, they said, we will construct Chinese walls, to 
make sure that there are not abuses.  Critics were (as it turned out, rightly so) skeptical; 
and raised the question, if effective Chinese walls were constructed, where were the 
economies of scope that provided the rationale for the mergers? 
 
The elimination of the barriers between investment and commercial banking provided 
more scope for conflicts of interest, amply demonstrated by the World Com/Enron 
scandals, e.g. the commercial division lending to firms that the investment division had 
issued IPO’s, in order to make them seem more “viable.”5  
 
These conflicts of interests may have not been at the center of the problem, but they 
clearly played a role.  So too in the 2007/2008 crisis.  Indeed, the closer interplay 
between investment banks and commercial banks almost surely contributed to the 
necessity of the Fed bail-out of Bear Stearns.  It was not just a few investors’ wealth that 
was at stake, should Bear Stearns fail, but the entire financial system.   
 
There have been other effects of the integration of investment and commercial banks that 
almost surely played a role in the debacle.  The culture of conservatism that had 
traditionally dominated commercial banking came into clash with the speculative drive of 
the investment banks, and it was the latter culture that dominated.6   
 
The Bernanke-Greenspan Put and Moral Hazard  
 
Economists have always been aware of the distorted incentives that bail-outs provide.  If 
a bank gambles (e.g. by making risky loans), and wins, the shareholders keep the gains.  
If a bank gambles and loses, there is a limit to the losses.  The government picks up the 
pieces.7  That is one of the reasons for the need for close supervision of banks; just like a 
                                                 
5 These conflicts of interest played a role in some of the worst scandals in the late 90s 
6 Further problems may have been raised by differences in accounting practices and regulations. 
7 This gives rise to convex pay-offs, which in turn give rise to excessive risk taking.  The problems arise 
whenever there is limited liability.  Due diligence on the part of those providing capital to the enterprise is 
supposed to provide at least some check against abuses.  Here, deposit insurance reduces, if it does not 
eliminate, the extent of the check.  Those who provide capital to the bank can ignore the risks.  This has led 
some to criticize deposit insurance.  But as the Bear Stearns and LTCM bail-outs illustrates, governments 
will bail out any financial institution whose bankruptcy can give rise to a systemic risk.  The major players 
are simply too large to fail, and they, and those who provide them credit, know it.  As Jerry Caprio once put 
it, there are two kinds of countries, those that have deposit insurance and know it, and those who have 
deposit insurance and don’t know it.  Moreover, monitoring banks to ensure that they are in a position to 
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company providing fire insurance needs to make sure that those insured have sprinklers, 
to reduce the extent of losses, so too the government, which either implicitly or explicitly 
is providing insurance, needs to make sure that banks are not engaging in excessive risk 
taking.   
 
Bernanke has now extended the coverage of bail-outs (“lender of last resort”) to 
investment banks, exacerbating all the problems to which we have already called 
attention. 
 
Though the adverse incentive effects of bail-outs are clear, it is not always so clear who 
benefits from them.8  The question is, what would have happened, were there not a bail-
out?  Who is better off?  Who is worse off?  Clearly, taxpayers are worse off:  at the very 
least, they have assumed risks that would otherwise have been borne by others.  The full 
answer depends in part, of course, on the terms of the bail-out.  For instance, in the 
discussion below of the Bernanke bail-out of Bear Stearns, those who would have lost 
money if Bear Stearns had gone under are better off.  Bear Sterns shareholders are better 
off than they would have been had it gone under.  Those who had “bet” on Bear Stearns 
going under are worse off.  Part of the reason that it is difficult to get a fully satisfactory 
answer to this question is that there is uncertainty about what would have happened if 
there had not been a bail-out.  If it would have led to a cascade of other failures, then all 
of these who otherwise would have gone under have benefitted.9 
 
 
Incentives—and opportunities—for fraud 
 
It should have been obvious to almost anyone involved—from those originating the 
mortgages, to those repackaging and securitizing them, to the rating agencies, and to the 
regulators—that there was something very wrong going on.   Some of the mortgages 
required no documentation, and no down payments.  With some of the appraisal 
companies owned by the mortgage originating companies, there were clear conflicts of 
interest.   A structure was in place for fraudulent behavior—for loans greater than the 
value of the house.10    And it is clear that such fraudulent behavior did occur.  Incentives 
matter, and if there are perverse incentives, there are perverse outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                 
repay their deposits is a public good; it is inefficient to rely on each depositor to do its own monitoring.  
The credit rating agencies’ recent performance makes clear the difficulties of relying on the private sector 
for the risk assessment.  There are simply too many conflicts of interest.  See also J. E. Stigltiz, “The Role 
of the State in Financial Markets,” Proceeding of the World Bank Conference on Development Economics 
1993, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, pp. 41-46. 
8 A point that was made forcefully in the IMF bail-outs in the late nineties:  there, it was clear that while the 
bail-outs were typically described as bail-outs of the country, they were more accurately described as bail-
outs for the lenders. 
9 In the Mexican bail-out, critics suggest that the main beneficiaries were Wall Street investors who held 
the bonds.   
10 This was especially true given the incentive structures.  For instance, mortgage brokers originating the 
mortgages were paid on a commission.  They faced no penalties in the event of a foreclosure.  They had an 
incentive to oversell, to explain how the markets were going up and would continue to go up, how the more 
one borrowed the more one made, how there would be no problem in obtaining additional finance when 
interest rates increased under the reset provisions.  In some cases they may have been deliberately 
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Both the regulators and those buying these securities should have been suspect:  a 100% 
mortgage is an option—if the price of the house goes up, the owner keeps the difference, 
if it goes down, he walks away.  Providing such mortgages is equivalent to giving away 
money.  But banks are not traditionally in the business of giving away money, especially 
to poor people.  How can one make money by giving away money?  The answer was 
simple:  they were in the business of creating pieces of paper that they could pass on to 
others.  As the expression goes, a fool is borne every moment, enough to create a market:  
especially when these fools are aided and abetted by wisemen, with strong reputations, 
rating agencies and long established investment banks. 
 
 
Not all of the mortgages provided, in effect, 100% financing.11  This provided another 
incentive for bad behavior.  Much has been written in recent years about the amount of 
money that lies at the bottom of the pyramid, and America’s financial institutions were 
determined to extract as much of that money out as fast as they could.  Many put their life 
savings into the purchase of their homes—money that in effect went to pay commissions 
to the mortgage brokers and others who benefitted from the housing boom so long as 
people continued to finance and refinance their homes.  They walked away with their 
commissions, no matter what happened to housing prices; it was the poor that were left to 
bear the risk.   
 
Many recognized that there was predatory lending going on.  Not surprisingly, the 
predation was especially strong among those who were financially not well educated.  
There were attempts to stop this predatory behavior, but lobbyists for those who were 






Still, many of the mistakes of the financial markets (including the banks and rating 
agencies) are attributable not to bad incentives, but to bad models—mistakes in modeling 
that were and should have been obvious before the collapse.  (To be sure, bad incentives 
may have encouraged them to adopt faulty models.)  They failed to understand the 
perverse, predictable and predicted, consequences of the incentive structures that they 
had created (described above). 
 
Failing to understand diversification 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
misleading those who they were trying to persuade to borrow; in other cases, they had deceived themselves.  
The situation was conducive to corruption:  enough money to be split among the brokers, the appraisers, the 
borrowers that all could gain from deception.   
11 Some of the mortgages did not initially provide 100% financing, but since the initial payments were less 
than the full interest that should have been due, they represented negative amortization, and the amount 
owed became greater than the value of the house. 
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  Market participants systematically ignored systemic risk.  They thought that securities 
consisting of a large number of mortgages would have a small probability of losing more 
than, say, 10% of their market value.  Based on recent history, what was the probability 
of large numbers going into default at the same time?   
 
They failed to realize that diversification has only limited value when risks are correlated; 
a fall in the price of housing, a rise in the interest rate, and an economic downturn all 
could give rise to correlated risk—an increase in the default rate.  The 2007/2008 
subprime mortgage crisis was not the first time that financial markets seemed to have 
underestimated both systemic risk and unlikely events.  Once in a century problems 




It should have been obvious that there was something wrong with their reasoning.  They 
argued that the new financial instruments were fundamentally changing the structure of 
the economy—it was these fundamental changes which presumably justified their huge 
compensation.  But at the same time, they were using data from before the introduction of 
these new instruments to estimate the parameters of their models, including the likelihood 
of default.  If it were true that they had opened up a new era, surely these parameters 
would have changed! 
 
Failing to understand systemic risk—a critical failure of the Basle II framework 
 
Basle II required banks to manage their own risks—as if that is what they would not have 
done on their own.  It presumed that the regulators could monitor complicated risk 
management systems of banks, or at least that the rating agencies could assess risk.  It is 
now clear that banks did not know how to manage risks and that the rating agencies did 
not know how to assess risk (or did not have the incentives to do it well.) 
 
But there was a more fundamental flaw with the Basle II framework.  Banks obviously 
have incentives to manage their risks—isn’t that supposed to be part of their basic 
business model?  Regulators need to focus on those areas where individual private risk 
management might not accord with managing social or societal risks well. 
 
One obvious example is provided by what happened (and what had happened earlier, in 
1987):  if all banks are using similar risk management systems, they may all try to sell 
certain assets in particular contingencies, in which case they can’t; prices fall in ways that 
were not anticipated.  Using similar risk management systems can give rise to correlated 
risks, with far larger than normal price movements.  
   
Banks have been criticized for using the same (or similar) models.  That is not really the 
key issue:  indeed, if they all the right model, based on rational expectations, then they 
would have to be using the same model.12  The problem was that they were all using 
                                                 
12 Of course, those with different assets and liabilities will face different risks, and the “models” may 
accordingly pay more attention to the relevant risks. 
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similar wrong models. They were using models that were not consistent with rational 
expectations; they were all using models that were such that, if they all used that model, 
the outcome could not have been consistent with the models themselves. 
 
There was a role for the regulator:  at the very least, it could have checked the 
consistency of the models.  Each firm may have been unwilling to share its model with 
other firms—they presumably believed that their ability to manage risk well may have 
given them a competitive advantage over other banks.  But they can be required to share 
their model with the regulator, who can assess the systemic implications, and the 
consistency of the models with systemic behavior.  
 
More generally, it was a major failing of Basle II not to recognize that there are systemic 
externalities—presumably one of the reasons for regulation in the first place.   
 
 
Detecting Ponzi schemes 
 
In each of the crises, little thought about the economic situation should have revealed that 
what was going on was not sustainable.  
 
Behind the scenes were two classic problems:  excessive leverage (typically in a non-
transparent form) and a pyramid scheme.  Everything might have worked well if house 
prices had continued to rise.  Those who borrowed beyond their ability to pay would have 
made sufficiently large capital gains that they could have repaid what was owed.  Those 
who lent without due diligence would have done just as well as those who had.   
 
 With money loans having in effect negative amortization, the borrowers owed more at 
the end of the period than at the beginning. Some expressed concern about what would 
happen when they had to pay the full interest due (as in most of the loans, after an initial 
period of “teaser rates.”)  They were told, not to worry:  they would easily refinance the 
loan.  They would then even be able to spend some of the capital gains, through mortgage 
equity withdrawals.   
 
But it should again have been obvious that it was unlikely that prices could have 
continued to rise, even without an increase in the interest rate.  Real incomes of most 
Americans have been declining.  Yet median house prices (even adjusting for overall 
inflation) were increasing, and dramatically so.  There was an obvious limit to the amount 
that can be paid for housing.  Anybody looking carefully at housing prices saw that what 
was going on was not sustainable.  How could prices (adjusted for overall inflation) 
continue to rise, as real incomes of most Americans, and especially those at the bottom, 
continued to fall? 
 





The failure of the financial system to perform its essential functions:  what were they 
doing? Regulatory arbitrage?     
 
In short, it is hard to reconcile what happened in that episode (as in the earlier ones) with 
any model of “rational” behavior.  But whether rational or irrational, failures in financial 
markets in the late 90s and in 2007/2008 have highlighted the importance of information 
imperfections.  In each instance, the results were clear:  the financial system failed to 
perform the functions which it is supposed to perform, allocating capital efficiently and 
managing risk.  In the late 90s, there was massive excessive investment, say, in fiber 
optics; in the first decade of this century, there was massive excessive investment in 
housing.  And while new products were created which were supposed to facilitate the 
management of risk, they actually created risk.  They were so non-transparent that when 
problems began to surface, no bank knew what its own balance sheet looked like, let 
alone that of a bank to whom it might lend. No wonder then that there was a freezing of 
the financial system. 
 
While they were creating risks with their new products, they were not creating the 
products that would help manage the socially important risks that needed to be managed.  
They were (for the most part) not creating risk products that were tailored to the needs of 
those that needed to have risk managed.  (Their failure to manage their own risks 
suggests that they might not have had the competence to do so, even if they had wanted 
to.)  In many cases, funds would buy the new derivative products as part of portfolios.  
Sub-prime mortgages and other assets were being sliced and diced, and then recombined, 
and the resulting products would then be mixed with other similarly artificially 
constructed products—and no one could easily ascertain the risk properties of the 
resulting portfolio.  As I suggest below, they were not really managing risk; they were 
engaged in regulatory arbitrage. 
 
There were real social needs for risk management, evidenced by the fact that millions of 
Americans may lose their homes.13  The new mortgages increased the risk borne by poor 
homeowners of interest rate fluctuations and credit market conditions.  This was 
especially true of those mortgages with reset provisions or balloon payments, which were 
often sold on the presumption that the individuals could refinance their mortgages.  There 
are alternative mortgages that would have shifted more of the risk to the market or made 
it easier for individuals to manage these risks (e.g. mortgages with variable maturities but 
fixed payments.)   
 
One hypothesis about what was really going on—beyond a fancier and hard to detect 
pyramid scheme, or the newest form of accounting deception, to replace those that had 
been exposed in the Enron/World Com scandals—is that this was a fancy version of 
regulatory arbitrage.  The problem facing financial markets was how to place these high 
risk sub-prime mortgages that were being created into sources of funding, many of which 
were highly regulated (such as pension funds).  These are regulated for a good reason:  
                                                 
13 The fact that developing countries continue to have bear the brunt of exchange rate and interest rate 
fluctuations is another example of the financial markets’ failure to transfer risk from those less able to bear 
it to those more able to do so.  See J. E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, especially Chapter  . 
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these institutions are fiduciaries, entrusting to make sure that funds are available for the 
purposes intended, financing individuals’ retirement.  They are, accordingly, not allowed 
to speculate on highly risky securities.  The bonds they invest in must have a high rating.  
These regulations give rise to the demand for financial alchemy.  If poorly rated sub-
prime mortgages could somehow be converted into an asset with a high enough rating to 
be placed in pension funds and other fiduciaries, there was money to be made:  if these 
assets could yield a slightly higher return than other comparably rated bonds, then there 
was an insatiable demand.  The difference between the return on the low rated sub-prime 
mortgage and the AAA products created by financial alchemy provided billions of dollars 
to be divided among all those participating in the scam—from those originating the 
mortgages (both the companies and those who worked for them), to those who did the 
repackaging, to the rating agencies. 
 
Someone, everyone had forgotten that oldest of economic adages:  there is no such thing 
as a free lunch.  Evidently, in their minds, money had been left on the table of decades, 
and only the power of modern finance had found it.  Where were the billions of dollars of 
true welfare gains that corresponded to the billions of dollars of seeming profits, bonuses, 
and commissions coming from?  Never mind, if no one could find a good answer.   
 
There was, of course, a simple answer, provided by the capital gains based pyramid 
scheme—some were cashing in on the gains, leaving the future losses to others.  At the 
same time, it became clear that financial prowess had created not only new vehicles for 
what might be called systemic deception, but had exposed a deeper problem within the 
capitalist system.  It was difficult at best to tell who was managing assets well, who was 
taking a long run gamble that would pay off well to the fund manager, but likely at the 
expense of those whose funds he was managing.  One could create assets that had a low 
probability of a large loss.  Assume, by way of example, that an asset had a 95% 
probability of a return that was above normal by 1%--in conventional terms, “almost 
certain”—but a 5% probability of a loss of x%.  If x > 20%, the expected return to this 
risk asset is actually less than a safe asset.  But on average, it will take twenty years 
before finding out the value of x.  It will be 20 years before one finds out whether the 1% 
excess return is enough to compensate for the loss.  But, of course, the hedge fund 
managers are paid not on the basis of 20 year performances; they walk away with the 
positive returns, regardless of the loss that occurs in that 20th year.       
 11
RESPONDING TO THE CRISIS 
 
The information-theoretic models provide considerable insight into what should have 
been done, and into what the deficiencies in what was done.  We divide the analysis into 




Given the magnitude of defaults on the sub-prime mortgages, it is not surprising that 
these problems became translated into defaults elsewhere in the system.  To be sure, if 
the risks had been fully diversified, rather than leveraged, it would have been easy for the 
system to absorb them:  the defaults were a small fraction of the financial wealth of the 
global system.  But given the lack of transparency, it is especially not a surprise that there 
was a “run” on a bank, with market participants pulling their money out (not rolling over 
loans.)  Even if they would have eventually fully recovered their assets, the risk of having 
their money tied up for an extended period of litigation, at a time when credit was tight, 
was simply not worth the slightly higher returns that they might receive.   
 
Greenwald and Stiglitz [    ] and Gellegati et al have emphasized the importance of credit 
interlinkages, and how defaults in one part of the system can lead to defaults elsewhere.  
It is easy to construct models of bankruptcy avalanches.  The fear was that a default by 
Bear Stearns would lead to a series of other defaults, and a run on other banks.  Indeed, 
even after Bear Stearns was bailed out (through a Fed financed acquisition by J.P. 
Morgan) so great was the fear of further defaults that the Fed extended its lender of last 
resort facility to investment banks.  Even most critics of the Fed agreed that, at that point, 
it had no choice.  It may have failed in providing an adequate regulatory structure; it 
almost surely failed in acting too late.  But given the risks at that moment, a bail-out was 
inevitable. 
 
The criticism is the form of the bail-out, which entailed potentially huge transfers of 
wealth to J.P. Morgan and large transfers to Bear Stearns shareholders, while taxpayers 
were put at risk for large amounts without any compensation.  If taken as a precedent, it 
expanded the scope of moral hazard, rewarding those who had engaged in excessively 
risky behavior and had been already richly compensated.  The defense that something had 
to be done quickly was hardly a defense:  that there were potential problems had long 
been recognized, and it is hard to believe that contingency plans had not been thought 
through.  Wall Street wanted a bail-out, and Wall Street got a bail-out; perhaps not as 
extensive as they had hoped, but still on terms that were unconscionable, in a manner that 
was not transparent, and that seemingly paid little attention to the large distributions of 
wealth that were generated.  Conflicts of interest (bordering on corruption) abounded.14 
 
The bail-out took the form of a non-recourse loan from the Fed to J.P. Morgan to acquire 
Bear Stearns (originally for $250 million, ck, later upped to $1.2 billion ck.)  The Fed 
                                                 
14 Similar concerns of corporate corruption had been noted in the publicly orchestrated by privately 
financed LTCM bail-out.  Shareholder money was being used to in part bail out personal investments by 
corporate officials. 
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gave $30 billion to J.P. Morgan, and got what was supposed to be an equivalent amount 
in collateral consisting of a mélange of assets, including sup-prime mortgages.  No one is 
sure how they were priced.  If the value of the assets falls below $29 billion, J.P. Morgan 
absorbs the first billion of losses, but taxpayers are at risk for the remainder (and 
obviously, for the first billion, if J.P. Morgan itself were to go bankrupt.)   
 
Non-recourse loans are, in effect, put options.  If the value of the collateral goes below 
$29 billion, J.P. Morgan has little incentive to pay back the loan.  In discussing the risk, 
attention has focused on the probability of default, particularly important because no one 
is sure how they were priced in the first place, i.e. what probability of default was built 
into the pricing.  But there is a second problem:  interest rate risk.  If interest rates rise, 
then the value of the assets declines.  Some of these assets are 30 year mortgages, 
meaning that they are highly sensitive to long term interest rates.  Providing a non-
recourse loan even if the assets are currently correctly priced is like giving away an 
option, an option with a very high value.  {see if you can calculate}.    
 
Particularly irksome was that the government stood to lose large amounts of money (both 
on the credit risk and the interest rate risk), but there was no upside potential.  
Meanwhile, Bear Stearns shareholders walked away with $1.2 billion, less than they 
would have liked, but still more than they should have, especially given their failure to 
manage risk appropriately.  
 
There were many ways that the taxpayers could have been protected, and at least received 
some compensation.  For instance, shareholder value could have been put into escrow, 
until it was clear that taxpayers’ money was not at risk.  The first $1.25 of losses would 
be paid either by J.P. Morgan or by shareholders.  J.P. Morgan could have been asked to 
pay a risk premium up front, and to pay the market value of the implicit put.  If the 
collateral turned out to be more valuable than the value assigned to it, the government 
could have demanded a fraction of the excess.     
 
Bailing out Bear Stearns also entailed large redistributions.  Many had bet on Bear 
Stearns going into bankruptcy (in credit default swaps).  Those that had bought insurance 
against this risk (bet that it would happen) were deprived of money that they otherwise 
would have received; those that provided the insurance received a windfall gain.  This 
market is itself not very transparent, but allegedly among those who received large 
windfall gains were the big investment banks—including J.P. Morgan.  (In defense of the 
bail-out, one could argue that the risk of a bail-out should have been priced into the 
insurance in the first place.  Still, the fact that J.P. Morgan was, in part being bailed out 
should have played into the terms at which the bail-out occurred.) 
 
The events subsequent to the bail-out evidenced many of the potential conflicts of 
interest.  The CEO of Bear Stearns was hired by J.P. Morgan, at handsome compensation.  
Clearly, a promise (pay-off) of this kind could interfere with his ability to negotiate in the 
best interests of the shareholders.  Shareholders had to vote on the acquisition.  But it is 
easy to show that those who had sold insurance against the risk of Bear Stearns going 
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bankrupt had an incentive to buy shares, to ensure that the acquisition went through, even 
if shareholders as a whole might have thereby been disadvantaged.15     
 
The bail-out orchestrated by the regulatory illustrates a problem common to discretionary 
regulatory policy, an issue that arose in the bail-out of LTCM, where not even public 
money was involved.  The regulator has a variety of carrots and sticks for inducing 
cooperation. Lack of cooperation can induce tighter scrutiny; fuller cooperation can buy 
regulatory forbearance, now or in the future.   In the case of LTCM, banks were induced 
to contribute funds to bail-out the hedge fund benefitting, not necessarily incidentally, 
many of the corporate executives of the same banks who were contributing money 
(another instance of the complex web of conflicts of interest.)  Was participation in the 
bail-out it in the best interests of the shareholders?  The New York Fed believed it was in 
the interests of the system as a whole.  But whether the individual banks agreed, and 
whether it was in the best interests of the individual participating bank, is another matter.    
 
In the case at hand, this combined with lack of transparency to leave a high level of 
uncertainty:  it does not appear that J.P. Morgan got a bad deal; on the contrary.  But was 
it because it outsmarted the Fed?  Because there were relatively few institutions able and 
willing to take over Bear Stearns, and the Fed wanted, at any cost, to avoid a collapse, 
and so, given exigencies of the moment, it could drive a hard bargain?   
 
There were several alternative courses. One which the U.K. eventually took (though the 
delay in doing so may have cost it a great deal) is nationalization.  (Whether the legal 
framework would have allowed the U.S. to do this may not be clear; but it was not clear 
whether the Bear Stearns bail-out was legal.  Paul Volker, Fed Chair from 1979 to 1986 
(ck, reference) has suggested that it is not.16 )  
 
It is curious that it has become acceptable for a foreign government, or, equivalently, a 
fund owned by a foreign government, to bail-out (or take over) a failing bank (as 
happened in the case of Merrill Lynch and Citibank), but there is still a reluctance to 
allow one’s own government to do so   The standard rationale against governments 
running/nationalizing banks is ideological:  governments shouldn’t do it; the private 
sector is better at running banks and other such enterprises than the public sector.  But the 
private sector has, in these instances, demonstrated its incompetence.  The public purse is 
at risk.  The government has a large stake in how the resolution is managed.  Indeed, with 
                                                 
15 Assume, for instance, that if the company had gone into bankruptcy, it would have been worth $400 
million and (in the original offer) shareholders only got $250 million.  But bankruptcy might have exposed 
the providers of insurance to an additional risk of $200.  They gain more in not paying out on their 
insurance more than they lose in market value.  They would vote for the acquisition, even if it was not in 
the interests of the shareholders as a whole.  As Stiglitz [   ] and Grossman and Hart [    ] point out, the 
equilibrium may not be consistent with shareholder value maximization.  A small shareholder who believes 
that the acquisition will go through (that those who will vote for acquisition are in a majority) will not pay 
more than $2.50 a share, if there were a million shares.  But, say, a bank (or even better, a consortium of 
banks) that had large outstanding liabilities if Bear Stearns goes bankrupt would be willing to pay more 
than $2.50 a share to obtain controlling interest to ensure that the acquisition did go through.  Of course, 
minority shareholders—that are not at risk if Bear Stearns goes bankrupt-- are left short changed. 
16 reference 
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implicit or explicit deposit insurance, it has more at stake than anyone else.  Yet it is 
difficult to provide incentives for any private firms that are compatible with the interests 
of the state.  It is far better to have the government manage the resolution.  (In the case of 
Bear Stearns, the public interest was even more complicated.  There was a public interest 
in maintaining the integrity of the financial system.  There were no formal liabilities, as 
in the case of deposit insurance.  What was required may not have been clear.  In the 
event, there was a huge transfer of wealth to J.P. Morgan to ensure that this was done.)   
 
There is a rationale for encouraging foreign government bail-outs:  the arms length 
bargaining ensures that the foreign government is not likely to be engaged in hidden 
transfers of wealth, as may have happened in the Bear Stearns bail-out, and as has 
happened in bail-outs in many countries.  On the other side, one of the concerns of 
government ownership of banks is that resources get directed according to political, not 
economic objectives.  This should presumably be more acceptable if it is one’s own 
government’s political agenda (though, as I have explained elsewhere17, if there are 
concerns about resources being used in ways that go counter to public interest, it is a sign 
of an inadequate regulatory framework—the problems could arise as well with domestic 
private ownership.) 
 
 There were still other alternatives:  the government could have lent to Bear Stearns 
directly.  This would have been more transparent.  And it would have been easier to 
design a system of allowing the government to participate in the upside potential, as the 
government did when it helped engineer Chrysler’s bail-out.  (Still a third alternative, 
more akin to the Chrysler bail-out, would be providing a public guarantee to private 
funds, though—other than ideology—it is not clear why this is preferable to the direct 
provision of government funds.)   
 
Again, in the instance, it may not have been consistent with the legal framework, though 
the Fed’s announcement that, going forward, it stood willing to lend to other investment 
banks, suggested that it believed that it did have regulatory authority.  The issue here is 
the design of the appropriate framework:  it would seem desirable to give government the 
right to lend, in return for taking a share of the potential gain or at sufficiently high 
interest rates to compensate for the risk that the collateral was less than the value 
assigned.1819 
 
Ownership is often defined as the residual claimant on the returns to an asset and residual 
control.  Current banking frameworks leave the government as the residual holder of 
negative claims and, in effect, with considerable residual control rights—when things 
turn out badly, but not when they turn out well.  They can run things once the patient gets 
                                                 
17 Tobin project paper  
18 It is curious that those who believe in free markets are not only willing to accept a government financed 
bail-out, but demand it; while they argue for the virtues of market determined prices, in these 
circumstances, they seem to suggest that market prices undervalue assets.   
19 J. E. Stiglitz and A. Weiss [“Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” American 
Economic Review, 71(3), June 1981, pp. 393-410] explain why charging an interest rate high enough to 
compensate for the risk may have adverse incentive effects, so that more complicated financial instruments 
–or even nationalization--may have to be required. 
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to the hospital, but they pick up the hospital bills, and can do little (or at least not enough) 
to prevent the accidents that lead to hospitalization.20  This seems neither efficient nor 
equitable; and in many countries, such policies have resulted in huge transfers of 
resources from the public to the private sector (e.g. in Mexico’s banking crisis.) 
 
Further comments on equity injections, capital adequacy standards, and forbearance 
 
Typically, financial injections into the banking system occur before the actual meltdown, 
while the bank is viable, but has failed to meet its regulatory capital adequacy standards.  
Banks facing such a situation can be forced to comply.  Typically, banks have found it 
difficult to raise the required capital.  Part of the reason is (as here) the uncertainty 
concerning the value of the assets and liabilities—made even worse here because of the 
lack of transparency in off balance sheet accounting and the complexity of products.  Part 
of the reason is that such problems are often associated with downturns, and there is a 
general scarcity of liquid funds for the bail-out.   The current instance may be an 
exception, or may be a harbinger of a new world.  The world is awash with liquidity—in 
fact excess liquidity is often blamed for the current problems; sovereign wealth funds 
have come to the rescue.  In today’s world of globalization, banks can turn to the global 
financial market.  Funds may be scarce in the U.S., but there is a whole world to turn to.  
There may be another factor at play:  the banks being bailed out are controlled by their 
managers.  Their interests may not fully coincide with those of their shareholders.  The 
managers may have been more willing to give up a greater share in the ownership of the 
bank to save the institution.  On the other hand, the sovereign wealth funds may have 
been more willing to pay more than a typical risk averse buyer, focused on the actuarial 
value of the assets and their risk to obtain a large share in these iconic assets. 
 
In the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the IMF strongly urged government regulators to 
enforce strictly capital adequacy standards.  I argued that such a policy could be 
counterproductive; if the banks couldn’t raise additional capital, it would force a 
contraction of their loan portfolio, further deepening the economic downturns, and 
possibly even worsening balance sheets, contributing to a downward spiral.   The IMF 
policy of no-forbearance was, in effect, instituting an automatic destablizer into the 
economy.   
 
One of the challenges in designing a regulatory regime based on capital adequacy 
standards is how to prevent this destabilizing behavior.  One proposal is to introduce 
countercyclical standards, i.e. that automatically loosen the standards when the economy 
is weak, and tighten them when the economy is strong.   
 
                                                 
20 In P. Orszag and J.E. Stiglitz, “Optimal Fire Departments: Evaluating Public Policy in the Face of 
Externalities,” with Peter R. Orszag, The Brookings Institution, Jan. 4, 2002. 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/orszag/20020104.htm, we explain the need for better 
regulation (accident prevention) in those instances (such as here) where, it is argued, that, when an 
accident occurs, there must be government action.   
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Another proposal is to use discretion.  Most countries engage in discretion.  Hopefully, 
the central bank can distinguish among the circumstances in which banks find 
themselves:  is it an isolated bank that is facing a problem, in which case forbearance 
should not be engaged in; or is it systemic risk.  (Of course, the government has to be 
careful—it can unwittingly encourage correlated behavior, which can increase systemic 
risk.)  One of the critics of the IMF and the US Treasury in the East Asia crisis was its 
failure to recognize the possible desirability of discretionary forbearance.  (The irony is 
that they worried that it would give rise to moral hazard—concerns that were evidently 
muted in the Bear Stearns bail-out.)21 
 
Some urged government capital injections capital adequacy standards could be met, and a 
few countries took this course.  Capital adequacy standards are supposed to serve two 
functions:  they ensure that the bank has enough capital at risk that it does not take on 
excessive risk, and it provides a buffer, so that the government does not have to put up as 
much money should things turn out badly.  When the government puts up money to meet 
the capital adequacy standards, it is doing little to protect taxpayers’ money:  if it puts the 
money in the form of equity, its money is now at risk even if the bank survives, but 
simply gets a low return.  But more important is the fact that incentives are little affected:  
controlling shareholders care about their wealth, not the wealth of the government; what 
they have at risk is unchanged.  Indeed, it can be shown that under some circumstances, 
incentives are adversely affected.  The existence of capital adequacy standards lowers the 
franchise value of a firm (it is a constraint imposed on the firm, and therefore has to 
lower owners’ expected discounted (utility of) future income), and dilutes existing 
shareholders claims on future franchise value.  As a result, the bank may even engage in 
more risky behavior (at the expense of taxpayers.)22 
 
In the transition from Communism to the market economy, it became clear how 
government’s control of the banking system (either directly through ownership of banks, 
or indirectly, through the granting of bank licenses and regulatory supervision) affected 
the wealth distribution:  those, and only those, who had access to capital could buy the 
assets, typically at far below prices that represented fair market value.  The question is, 
today, is Central Bank liquidity doing something similar, though admittedly on a far less 
                                                 
21 In addition, the objective function of the IMF and the individual countries may have differed markedly.  
The former may have been concerned with consequences for the global financial system, the latter focused 
more narrowly on consequences for the national financial system and economy. 
22 See  T. Helmann,  K. Murdoch, and J. E. Stiglitz,  “Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking and 
Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?” American Economic Review, 90(1), March 
2000, pp. 147-165; T. Helmann,  K. Murdoch, and J. E. Stiglitz,  “Franchise Value and the Dynamics of 
Financial Liberalization,” in Designing Financial Systems in Transition Economies; Strategies for Reform 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Anna Meyendorff and Anjan Thakor (eds.), MIT Press, 2002, pp. 111-127. 
T. Helmann,  K. Murdoch, and J. E. Stiglitz,  “Financial Restraint and the Market Enhancing View, in The 
Institutional Foundations of East Asian Economic Development, Y. Hayami and M. Aoki (eds.), London: 
MacMillan, 1998, pp. 255-284; T. Helmann,  K. Murdoch, and J. E. Stiglitz,  “Financial Restraint: Toward 
a New Paradigm,”, in The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development, M. Aoki, H. Kim, 
and M. Okuna-Fujiwara (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 163-207;  K. Murdock and J. E. Stiglitz,  
“The Effect of Financial Repression in an Economy with Positive Real Interest Rates: Theory and 
Evidence,” August 1993. 
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grand scale.  If the Central Bank lends money to Bank A, and Bank A lends money to 
Hedge Fund Alpha, and Hedge Fund Alpha uses some of the money to buy shares in 
Bank B, and at the same time, the Central Bank lends money to Bank B, and Bank B 
lends money to Hedge Fund Beta, and Hedge Fund Beta uses some of the money to buy 
shares in Bank A, we can recapitalize both Bank A and Bank B.  It is a private sector 
recapitalization—of course all funded by the government, but with a set of smoke and 
mirrors so confusing that no one (outside a few skeptic economists—and who pays 
attention to them anyway) can figure out what is going on.  The wonderful thing about 
this charade is that it perpetuates the longstanding dogma:  privatize assets while 
socializing risk.  If the banks do well, the hedge funds walk off with the profits; if the 
banks do poorly, the taxpayers pick up the pieces.   
 
Is this really what is happening?  In a sense, one can’t really answer that question:  funds 
are fungible.  We don’t have a clear view of what would have happened but for the extra 
liquidity provided to the banking system.  What is clear is that the extra liquidity makes 
the recapitalization of the banking system easier. 
 
Restricting Hidden Bail-outs 
 
Increasingly, there are concerns that the Fed  currently is too centered on bailing out 
ailing banks and financial institutions (and possibly even those losing money on the stock 
market) and less with maintaining the real strength of the economy..   
 
This perspective was put forward by Princeton economics professor Uwe Reinhardt, in a 
letter to the Financial Times (February 21, p 10): 
 
 You report (Ft.com, February 18) that the Federal Reserve has quietly lent US 
banks “on relatively attractive terms” some $50bn to ease the credit crunch now befalling 
main street American business. 
Would it not have been more efficient for the Fed to have lent the $50bn directly to main 
street business, on similarly subsidized terms, in place of feeding horses that may or may 
not feed the birds? After all, unlike most solid real businesses, banks worldwide have 
amply demonstrated their inability to fully understand and value the assets – often just 
casino-like bets – into which they place the enormous sums entrusted to them. 
I realise, of course, that the Fed’s lending directly to Main Street would immediately be 
decried as “socialism” in our financial press. Miraculously, when the Fed bails out inept 
private banks on subsidised terms it is called “prudence” rather than socialism. That may 
fool seasoned adults, but not any straight-thinking freshman in economics. 
The fact is that when the Fed buys mortgages and other assets that are not widely traded, 
there is a risk that it will be overpaying—the lack of transparency should itself be a 
concern in a democratic society.  It is understandable why the Fed wanted to do 
something about the freezing of credit markets; it is understandable that those in the 
affected institutions wanted a bail-out.  But it was incumbent on the Fed to do so in ways 
which do not put at risk taxpayers money23, and which do not reward the financial 
institutions for their behavior.  The fact is that the financial markets created these non-
                                                 
23 Profits of the Fed are turned over to the Treasury, so that any losses have a direct impact on the Treasury. 
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transparent hard-to-price financial instruments; they should now bear the consequences.  
If the Fed has used only a small fraction of the financial ingenuity that went into the 
creation of the mess, it could have protected American taxpayers against the risks; it 
could, for instance, have insisted that the banks from which it bought these mortgage 
backed instruments provide insurance that, should the value of these instruments decline, 
e.g. as a result of an increase in default rates, the banks would make the Fed whole.  One 
could only surmise that it deliberately decided not to protect American taxpayers; and 
that it may have done so because what was desired was a bail-out.   
Congress should consider passing legislation to ensure that when the Fed engages in such 
risky transactions, American taxpayers are protected, and that whatever it does, should be 
done more transparently.  Similar legislation should be undertaken in other countries. 
 
The Foreclosure Problem 
 
The immediate problem facing the U.S. today is that of mounting foreclosures—by some 
estimates, if house prices fall as much as some (like Shiller) predict, as many as a quarter 
of all mortgages may be underwater.  Not all of these will default.  But unless something 
is done about the foreclosure problem more mortgages will go into default, with follow-
on consequences for the financial sector.   
 
Dealing with the current foreclosure problem:  a homeowner’s chapter 11 
 
There are a number of easy ways of dealing with the foreclosure problem—such as 
bailing out the lenders at the same time as writing down the loans—which, in the absence 
of budget constraints and worries about future moral hazard would make everyone (other 
than ordinary taxpayer) happy.  Individuals could stay in their homes and lenders would 
avoid taking a hit to their balance sheets.  Knowing that the government is taking this risk 
off of balance sheets would contribute to alleviating the credit crunch.   
 
The challenge is how to save the homes of the hundreds of thousands of those who 
otherwise would lose their homes, and not bail out the lenders, who should be made to 
bear the consequences of their failures to assess risk.   
 
One answer is a “homeowners’ chapter 11”—a speedy restructuring of liabilities of 
poorer homeowners, modeled on the kind of relief that we provide for corporations who 
cannot meet their debt obligations.  Chapter 11 is premised on the idea that keeping a 
firm going is critical for the firms’ workers and other stakeholders.  The firm’s 
management can propose a corporate reorganization which the Courts review.  If found 
acceptable, there is a quick discharge of debt—the corporation is given a fresh start.  The 
homeowners’’ chapter 11 is premised on the idea that no one gains from forcing a 
homeowner out of his home.  There are large transactions costs associated with 
foreclosure.   This relief should be available for households with income below a critical 
threshold ($150,000) and with non-household, non-retirement wealth below some critical 
threshold (perhaps dependent on age).  The house would be appraised, and the 
individual’s debt would be written down to, say, 90% of the level of that appraisal 
(reflecting the fact that were the lender to have to proceed with foreclosure, that would be 
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substantial transactions costs).  The borrower could then get a FHA loan as described in 
the next section. 
 
Expanded homeownership initiatives 
 
Advocates of the reckless subprime mortgages argued that these financial innovations 
would enable large numbers of Americans to become homeowners for the first time.  
They did become homeowners—but for a very short time, and at a very high cost.  The 
fraction of Americans that will be homeowners at the end of this episode is likely to be 
lower than at the beginning.  The objective of expanding homeownership is, I believe, a 
worthy one, but clearly the market route has not worked well—except for the mortgage 
brokers and investment banks who profited from them. 
 
The underlying problem is simple to state:  median household income has been falling, 
and house prices rising.  This means that housing is becoming less and less affordable to 
more and more Americans.  There are no easy fixes to the declining incomes (other than 
shifting the burden of taxation away from these individuals and towards those who have 
been doing well.  Nor is there any way (short of public housing programs) that we can 
quickly reduce housing prices.  (The market correction currently going on is likely to 
make housing more affordable.)   
 
We need to help individuals with their housing costs.  Note that America (and many other 
countries) does this with upper income individuals—tax deductibility of mortgages and 
property taxes means than the government pays a large fraction of the carrying costs.  But 
ironically, it does not do that with those who need the help the most. 
 
A simple remedy is converting the current mortgage and property tax deduction into a flat 
rate cashable tax credit; the reduction in the subsidy to upper income Americans could 
help pay for the subsidy for poorer Americans.  (Even better would be a progressive 
subsidy, with a higher rate for the poor than the rich).  A 25% tax credit would increase 
the affordability of housing for many Americans. 
 
 
  New Mortgages  
 
Ironically, the financial sector, for all of its claims at innovation, has not innovated in 
ways which are directed at shifting risk from poor Americans to those who are more able 
to bear the risk.  For instance, even if mortgages are variable rate, poor Americans 
struggling to make ends need to know what their monthly payments are going to be.  One 
can have fixed payments, even with variable rate mortgages, if one lets the maturity of 
the mortgage be variable.   
 
The government has repeatedly had to take the initiative in innovating financial products 
(like making mortgages widely available) that meet the needs of ordinary citizens.  When 
they are proven, the private sector often steps in.  This may be another instance where 
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government will have to take the initiative, because of the failure of the private sector to 
do what it should.   
 
   Preventing foreclosures 
 
There is little, at this juncture, that government can do to prevent large numbers of 
mortgages from going “underwater,” i.e. the mortgage will exceed the value of the 
property.  But not all properties that are underwater will go into foreclosure.  In a world 
with full rationality and perfect pricing, clearly individuals who see that the value of the 
house is less than the value of the mortgage should default:  they can buy another (or the 
same) house at the lower price, and will be better off at least by the amount that the house 
is underwater.  But individuals care about their reputation, and many will be reluctant to 
go into foreclosure.  That is why the kinds of programs described in the previous section 
may help:  if they can stay in their homes and meet their mortgage payments, they will try 
to do so. 
 
There are other proposals that affect incentives to default.  One proposal (due to Martin 
Feldstein) would exchange, say, 20% of the individual’s current mortgage for a lower 
interest rate government loan (the government could pass on the advantage of its lower 
borrowing rate, so that the program would not cost the government anything).  But the 
government loan would not be a non-recourse loan, so that even if the individual 
defaulted on his house, he would still be obliged to repay.  There would then be little 
incentive to default.  Individual’s would only default when the price of the house was 
lower than the non-recourse debt, and for that to happen would require a very large fall in 
real estate prices. 
 
One interesting aspect of the proposal is that it implicitly recognizes a market failure in 
financial markets—that the government has an advantage, both in raising funds (because 
of the almost zero probability of default) and in collecting.  These have provided part of 
the rationale for government student loan programs and government mortgages; and yet 
the right has often insisted that the government not engage in these financial activities. 
 
Beyond that, this proposal would, in effect, be giving a large gift to lenders—in effect, 
homeowners would be asked to give up their option, in return for a lower interest rate.  
(Most likely, financial unsophisticated borrowers would not understand the market value 
of the option, and would only see the reduced payments.  In a sense, the government 
would be duplicitous, unless it informed them of the value of the option.)   
 
A slight modification of this proposal would, however, reduce the likelihood of 
foreclosure at the same time that it would not be giving such an unwarranted transfer to 
lenders.  The government could act as an intermediary, allowing lenders to buy back the 
option at a fair market value (thereby reducing the uncertainty which they and markets 
face), and encourage households to do so (a) using (most of) the proceeds to buy down 
the value of the outstanding mortgage; and (b) convert another 10% to 20% of the 
mortgage into a recourse loan with interest at the government interest rate (plus an 
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appropriate transactions cost).  Lenders participating in this program would, of course, 




Under current circumstances, monetary stimulus is likely to be ineffective, for several 
reasons, and even were it effective, it is not obvious that that is desirable.   Over recent 
years, monetary policy has worked mainly by encouraging a housing bubble, which has 
sustained a consumption boom.  (High levels of profits have meant that many firms are 
less dependent on borrowing than might normally be the case.)  (a)  If monetary policy 
works through the same channels, it is not clear that that is desirable—it will simply 
prolong the adjustment period.  (b) Banks are not going to be willing and able to lend, 
given the impairment to their balance sheets and the uncertainties which they face—
including uncertainties concerning their balance sheets. (c)  With prospects of a 
continued decline in real estate, it is not clear that households either will be willing to 
take more money out of their housing, in mortgage equity withdrawals.  So far, interest 
rate reductions have had two effects:  (a) they may have contributed to a weaker dollar, 
thus helping export America’s problems to other countries.  But from a global 
perspective, this is simply a new version of a “beggar thy neighbor” policy.  (b) Their 
actions may have prevented a meltdown of the financial markets—but as we have 
suggested at an unnecessarily high cost.   
 
Today, monetary policy faces two further challenges:  increased liquidity in American (or 
European) markets does not necessarily translated into lower real interest rates—
especially lower real medium or long term interest rates—if there is a belief that the 
lower interest rate will lead to higher inflation.  As interest rates were raised by the Fed in 
the period after 2003, it had less of an adverse effect than some had expected, because 
medium and longer term interest rates did not increase in tandem.  Today, we face the 
possibility that something similar will happen:  as interest rates are again lowered, 
medium and long term interest rates may not fall.  They may even increase.   
 
Secondly, increased liquidity in American (or European) markets does not necessary 
translated into increased investment expenditures in the U.S. (or Europe.)  The liquidity 
that is provided to financial markets can be spent wherever investors believe the returns 
are highest.  There are worries that the increased liquidity in Western financial markets 
will show up as increased demand for real estate assets in China and elsewhere in Asia.   
 
Even Bernanke seems to have given up on the notion that monetary policy can rekindle 
the economy.  The burden must shift to fiscal policy.  Unfortunately, there has been little 
attention paid to basic economic principles in the design of the stimulus package. 
 
America needs a stimulus but it needs to be well designed and quick-acting. (If current 
trends continue, the same will be true for Europe.)  Any stimulus will add to the deficit, 
but with the deficit soaring over the past seven years, it is especially important to have as 
big as bang for the buck as possible.  The stimulus should address long term problems—
and at the very least, it should not make them worse. 
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Automatic stabilizers—programs that lead to increased spending if and only if the 
economy goes into a downturn—are able to dose out the right medicine as the economy 
needs it.  America has one of the worst unemployment insurance systems among 
advanced industrialized countries. It should begin by strengthening it not just because it’s 
the right thing to do but because money received by the unemployed would be spent 
immediately and so help the economy.  Unemployment insurance has the biggest bang 
for the buck. 
 
Unfortunately, states and localities are already beginning to feel the pinch—and will do 
so even more as property values fall.24  Typically, they cut back spending in tandem with 
the decrease in revenues.  (Most states are required to have balanced budgets, and are 
loathe to raise taxes in the midst of a recession.)    This acts as an automatic destabilizer. 
 The federal government needs to provide some assistance to the states and localities, to 
prevent this happening, and even better, to help them address the striking inadequacies in 
infrastructure.  New Orleans levees and Minneapolis bridges are the tip of an iceberg:  we 
as a country have underinvested in infrastructure.  Spending on infrastructure would 
promote growth in the long run and strengthen the economy in the short run.   
  
The Bush Administration has long taken the view that tax cuts (especially permanent tax 
cuts for the rich) are the solution to every problem.  This is wrong.  The problem with tax 
cuts in general is that they perpetuate the excessive consumption that has marked the 
American economy. But middle and lower income Americans have been suffering for the 
last seven years—median income is lower today than it was in 2000.  A tax rebate 
targeted only at lower and middle income households makes sense, especially since it 
would be fast acting. 
 
There is some reason to be worried that the bank for the buck from tax rebates may be 
less than in previous occasions, because of the high level of indebtedness and the 
growing awareness of difficulties in obtaining credit going forward.  Many Americans 
can be expected to use some or all of their tax rebates to pay off some of their debts.  
There would be real benefits for their sense of security; and the financial system may 
benefit from a lower rate of defaults.  But the stimulus to the economy, in terms of 
increased expenditures, may be less.25   
 
It would be nice, of course, if we could stimulate investment in plant and equipment—not 
just in more housing.  But the standard ways of doing this are largely gifts to corporations 
for investment that they would otherwise have done—the bang for the buck is remarkably 
small.  It is possible to craft a more effective investment stimulus, a marginal investment 
tax credit, but in the past, the corporate sector has shown little interest in such measures. 
 It is the gift they want, not the stimulus. 
                                                 
24 A similar dynamic occurred in the 2001 downturn. 
25 There should be something done about foreclosures—along the lines discussed in the previous section.  
But not too much should be spent on this. A big fund would almost surely wind up being a bail-out fund for 




America’s infrastructure, and public investment more generally, has been starved for a 
long time.  America should be engaged in R & D to reduce our dependency on oil, and 
should be investing more in public transportation.  These investments would bring triple 
dividends, not just the ordinary direct economic returns, but make us more energy secure, 
and, by reducing the demand for oil, could help drive down the price of oil.  Not a single 
one of the world’s top ten airports lies in the United States.  Studies show that the returns 
to public investment in R & D are extra-ordinarily high.  These public investments would 
be complementary to private investments, and by increasing the returns to the private 
sector, actually encourage investment there.   
 
Other forms of public investment, such as on education, would stimulate the economy in 
the short run—far more than tax rebates would—and promote growth in the long run 
(again, far more than tax rebates.) 
 
In 2001, the Bush Administration used the impending recession as an excuse for the tax 
cuts for upper income Americans—the very group that had done so well over the 
preceding quarter century.  They were not designed to stimulate the economy, and they 
did so only to a limited extent. Many of the country’s current woes can be traced to that 
decision.   To keep the economy going, the Fed was forced to lower interest rates in an 
unprecedented way, and to look the other way as America engaged in reckless lending. 
 The economy was sustained—on borrowed money –but it was unsustainable.  
 
The example, unfortunately, was copied by other countries.  But now the problems at the 
bottom are worse, especially with rising food and energy prices.    
 
We have described what a good stimulus program should focus on:  (a) maximizing the 
bang for the buck—the largest stimulant per dollar of deficit; (b) addressing the country’s 
long run problems; and (c) fast acting.   
 
This time America, and other countries that face a slowdown, need a stimulus that 
stimulates.  We know how to design a stimulus that works and will help address some of 
America’s glaring problems, many of which (including the disparity between the rich and 
the poor) have only grown worse.  
 
 
PREVENTING FUTURE CRISES:  REFORMING FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 
 
As we have repeatedly emphasized, there are two compelling arguments for regulation:  
the actions within the financial sector have effects on others and government (partly as a 
result of this) will have to bear the costs of mistakes.  Just as fire insurance companies 
must regulate those they insure, requiring them to have sprinklers, so too government, as 
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insurer of last resort, must do what it can to lower the probability of the (implicitly or 
explicitly) insured against event occurred.26   
 
It is clear, for all the best intentions, regulations imposed in the past have not worked, and 
as we think of new regulatory systems, we have to think of the reasons for the failure of 
past systems.  At least three factors play a role:  (a) Recent beliefs—grounded neither in 
economic theory, or historical experience-- in self-regulation (that market discipline 
ensures that only the best survive) has resulted in deregulation.  (b) Regulatory capture—
the regulatory mechanism has been captured by those that it is supposed to regulate, 
especially common in the international context.  (c)  A lack of understanding of finance 
and accounting has led to regulatory frameworks that are open to regulatory arbitrage and 
manipulation.  In addition, there is always a lack of balance:  there is no comparison 
between the compensation of the regulators and those they are supposed to be regulating.  
This may contribute to regulatory capture, but it should be clear—it does not make 
regulation infeasible.  We have a tax system which collects taxes, even though those paid 
to avoid taxes are paid far more than the tax collectors.  But an understanding of this 
imbalance has implications for the design of the regulatory system.   
 
There are two more challenges facing the design of the regulatory system.  We want to 
encourage innovation, and we want to promote macro-stability.  We have noted earlier 
how some regulations, for instance, may act as automatic destabilizers.   
 
Finally, in our world of globalization, each country worries about competition.  There is a 
worry this will generate a race to the bottom.  I believe that good regulation is, or can be, 
a competitive advantage.  Singapore has attracted funds because those putting money into 
that country have some confidence that its banks are viable.  But just as actions of banks 
have externalities, so too do regulatory frameworks, and it would be best if there were 
coordinated actions in adopting good regulatory frameworks.  But if this is not achieved, 
I argue in the final subsection, that Europe and the United States have sufficient 
economic influence to ensure the adoption of good regulatory frameworks within their 
borders. 
 
In the paragraphs below, I describe certain key aspects of the regulatory framework that I 
think may not have received sufficient attention.  Regulators should focus more on 
improving incentives, we need to pay more attention to accounting frameworks, and we 




There have been problems in market incentives and regulatory incentives that almost 
surely played an important role in each of the problems detailed above.  For markets to 
work well, private incentives have to be aligned with social objectives.  This has not been 
                                                 
26 There are other aspects of regulation in the financial (and other) sectors, which we have discussed 
elsewhere:  ensuring competition and consumer (borrower, investor) protection; and ensuring access to 
credit for underserved groups. 
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the case.  Here are a set of reforms that would at least improve the alignment of 
incentives. 
 
1.  Improved incentives in securitization 
 
One of the problems with securitization is that mortgage originators did not hold the 
mortgages, and so had less incentive to ensure that the borrower had the ability to repay.  
Their incentives were directed at persuading the buyer of the mortgages that they had the 
ability to pay.    Requiring that mortgage originators retain a fraction of the risk of the 
loans that they originate would encourage greater care in lending. 
 
2.  Improved incentives in rating agencies 
 
This is one of the two incentive issues that have been widely discussed:  with rating 
agencies being paid by those putting together the complex products, they have an 
incentive to please those who are paying them.  The problems are analogous to those 
confronting the accounting firms, that Sarbanes-Oxley attempted to address.  The fix here 
is not so easy.  There are large numbers of buyers of securities, and it is not obvious how 
to design a system in which the buyers of the securities pay the cost.  The problems are 
related to fundamental problem in the supply of information; it is one of the reasons that 
in some key areas (like food safety) we do not rely on private certification.  There is at 
least an overlay of government oversight.  This is part of the motivation for the financial 
products safety commission discussed below. 
 
3. Improved incentives in hedge funds and financial managers 
 
Part of the problems in recent years in financial markets may be related to the incentive 
structures facing hedge fund managers, and financial managers more generally.  These 
are incentive structures designed to enhance risk taking; the question is, are they 
encouraging excessive risk taking, and partly at the expense of the public?  The incentive 
structures encourage gambling.  Financial managers can do well for themselves if they 
make large amounts one year, offset by equal losses the next.  The former results in large 
bonuses; the latter has no penalty.  
 
 It is when the hedge funds interact with regulated financial entities, like banks and 
fiduciaries, that the problems become particularly acute.  Government has imposed 
regulations on these financial entities for good reason—concern about systemic risk and 
the protection of the savings of retirees.  It is not the intent of government to give 
opportunities for those in the financial markets to make money through regulatory 
arbitrage or by taking advantage of implicit or explicit government insurance (bail-outs).  
But the current system gives them ample opportunity to do so.  Accordingly, the 
incentive pay structures of those hedge funds or financial entities that either receive funds 
from or provide products to these regulated financial institutions should be regulated. 
(This is great but should there also not be controls on the level of total leverage?)  The 
incentive pay structures within the regulated financial institutions (banks, fiduciaries) 
should similarly be regulated.   
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At a minimum, bonuses must be based not on the performance in any single year, but on 
the performance over a much longer time period; at least a substantial part of the bonus 
paid in any one year should be held in escrow, to be offset against losses attributable to 
the investments made in subsequent years. 
 
4. Improved incentives for regulators 
 
The full regulatory authority of the regulators (e.g. of the Fed) was not used to prevent 
the current problems.  It was only after the crisis that the Fed adopted regulations—a 
classic case of closing the barn door after the horses are out.  There is a large literature on 
regulatory capture; self-regulation typically does not suffice, partly because of incentives 
(those in the financial markets were making good money; no one wants to be a party 
pooper), partly because of mind-set (those within the industry are less likely to see a 
bubble than disinterested third-parties).    
 
Those entrusted with regulating the industry have to identify with those who are most 
likely to lose in the event of a malfunction of the market, not with those who are winning 
as a result of the malfunction of the market.  At the very least, there is a need for greater 
balance.   
 
In many industries, expertise resides mainly in those in the industry, and this poses a 
particular problem in the design of regulatory authorities.  There are today, however, 
large numbers of highly qualified individuals who understand financial markets 
(especially in academia) who could play a more active role in regulation.  One would still 
have to take precautions, e.g. against revolving doors.   
 
5.  Conflicts of interest 
Conflicts of interest give rise to distorted incentives.  There are several potential conflicts 
of interests that have surfaced; at this juncture, it is important to ascertain what role they 
played.  Those involved in the mortgage business (at any point in the supply chain) 
should not have a financial interest in firms that appraise property values.  The problems 
are obvious.   
Similarly, for a financial firm to buy “insurance” for its mortgages (bonds) from a 
company in which it owns a large stake vitiates the purpose of insurance.  It is not 
insurance, but self-insurance.  It does not transfer the risk, even if it helps improve 
“ratings.”  But if it does help improve ratings, it is almost surely partially due to failures 
in the rating methodologies.   
At the time Glass-Steagall was repealed, there were worries about a variety of forms of 
conflicts of interest.  In the years since, it appears that some of those worries have, at 
least in some instances, were justified.  While there may be no appetite for reinstating 
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restrictions, more thought should be given to regulations, with penalties for those that 
disregard them, that might address some of the problems that have appeared.   
 
Information, Accounting and Capital Adequacy Frameworks 
 
Much recent discussion has focused on increased transparency and more extensive 
disclosure.  It has become increasingly clear that disclosure requirements by themselves 
will not suffice, and that the manner in which information is disclosed makes a 
difference.  The latter point was highlighted by the controversy over disclosure of stock 
options, and the requirement that they be “expensed.”  Many firms that made extensive 
use of stock options did not object to disclosing that information in footnotes, presumably 
because they understood that such disclosures would have few consequences; they 
objected strenuously to even conservative approaches to accounting for these stock 
options, because it would reveal the extent to which ownership claims were being 
diluted.27   
 
Accounting is important, because it provides frameworks in which information is 
presented.  On the basis of that information, taxes are levied, firms make decisions, e.g. 
about which activities to expand, and which to contract, and investment gets allocated.  
Flawed and distorted information leads to flawed and distorted decisions.  The problem, 
repeatedly noted, is that there are incentives to provide flawed and distorted information.  
Firms have an incentive to provide too low an estimate of profits for tax purposes, too 
high an estimate to persuade investors to invest more in their company.  These 
countervailing incentives often act as a check against each other.   
In recent years, innovations in accounting (not all of positive value) have enabled some 
firms to maintain, in effect, multiple books—presenting one set of numbers to tax 
authorities, another set of numbers to investors.  But just as they learned how better to 
deceive tax authorities (by and large, viewed as a legitimate activity), they learned how 
better to deceive investors.  Making matters worse, distorted compensation systems—
including stock options—provided even stronger incentives for providing distorted 
information.28 
 
The Enron-Worldcom scandals of the early years of this decade exposed some of these 
accounting problems.  Not enough attention has been paid to the failure of the accounting 
frameworks in the current context.  They signaled huge profits in 2003-2006, but did not 
signal the offsetting even larger losses that have now been exposed.  This should not have 
happened; what it signals is, I think, that something is wrong with the accounting 
frameworks.   
 
                                                 
27 I have discussed the issue of disclosure requirements more extensively elsewhere (Tobin project paper.)   
28 One can design incentive systems with less risk and better incentives than traditional stock options.  
Indeed, these result in corporate executives bearing risks of random stock market fluctuations, unrelated to 
their activities (including changes in interest rates).  In practice, however, stock options have served more 
as an excuse for high corporate compensation; when shares have fallen, the executives have found other 
ways of receiving compensation, so that the relation between corporate performance and compensation is 
relatively weak.  See J. E. Stiglitz, Roaring Nineties, WW Norton, 2003. 
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Bad accounting frameworks not only do not provide accurate information; they lead to 
distorted behavior.  Not marking to market, for instance, provides an incentive for 
excessive risk taking:  one can sell of assets that have gained in value, recording a profit, 
and hold on to assets that have decreased in value (keeping them at book value.)   
 
But we are beginning to discover some consequences of (poorly designed) mark to 
market systems.  Banks are now marking to market their liabilities.  As their default 
probability increases, the value of their bonds decreases, and so their balance sheet 
improves!  Bonds, of course, may have covenants that they cannot be bought back at 
below par—without such covenants, borrowers would have an incentive to announce bad 
news, to depress the value of their debt, so they could buy it back at below par.  Never 
mind that the fall in the price of bonds indicates that the firm is going to face higher 
borrowing costs in the future—it is signaling worse future prospects for firms.  Under 
current U.S. rules, the firm can record an improvement in its position. 
 
In the current crisis, off-balance sheet assets were obviously incorrectly priced.  Banks 
could book some of the profits they made in “repackaging” sub-prime mortgages, even 
though they retained residual risk in these off-balance sheet mispriced assets.  It is not 
clear to what extent these accounting problems simply misled those looking at the banks, 
and to what extent these provided the underlying motivation for the transactions.  In any 
case, it is clear that accounting failures provided scope for the problems that have been 
uncovered. 
 
While the problems of not-marking to market have long been understood, the recent crisis 
has exposed some of the problems of using marking to market for capital adequacy 
(highlighting problems that critics actually raised before mark to market was imposed):  
market prices might overshoot, the decline in market prices exceeding the “true” decrease 
in value, forcing the bank to unnecessarily raise more capital and/or cut back on lending.  
The cutback in lending would, in turn, lead to further weakening in the economy.  (It is, 
perhaps, ironic, that from the champions of markets comes an argument based on market 
failure.)  Marking to market may thus exacerbate the automatic pro-cyclical effects of 
capital adequacy standards.  
 
 Given the long standing tendency of financial markets to over expand in booms, there is 
a need for countercyclical controls.  One form is cyclically adjusted capital adequacy 
standards.  In the most recent crisis, a simpler set of controls might have sufficed.  As the 
bubble progressed, while the probability of a decline in price increased, the loan-to-value 
ratios increased.  Requiring larger down payments (and assigning disproportionately 
higher risk to higher loan to value mortgages) almost surely would have dampened the 
bubble.   
 
Designing better provisioning requirements (and adjusting these to the changing 
circumstances) might both have dampened the fluctuation and ensured that the 
consequences of the breaking of the bubble were less.  While Greenspan often said that 
one cannot predict with certainty when there is a bubble, as home prices increased 
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(relative to incomes), the likelihood that prices would fall (by any given amount) was 
increased, and there should, accordingly, have been larger provisions.      
 
By the same token, there are other indicia of impending problems, and these ought to be 
incorporated in provisioning requirement and capital adequacy standards.  Research 
suggests that there may be some simple indicia of problems.  Had these been employed, 
red flags would have been raised about some of the potential problems.  As a World Bank 
study, headed by Amar Bhattacharya, done before the 1997 crisis pointed out29, a strong 
indicator of a looming problem, for instance, are rapidly expanding credit (in the 
aggregate, or in particular institutions.)  The capacity of institutions to expand rapidly 
their ability to make sound judgments about credit worthiness is limited.  Problems in 
lending typically do not show up until two or three years after the rapid expansion has 
begun, so that in such situations the ratio of non-performing loans provides a poor 
indicator.  There is seldom an economic transformation that would warrant this kind of 
rapid credit expansion.  One of the recommendations of the World Bank study was the 
imposition “speed bumps,’ for instance requiring higher than normal risk adjustments in 
capital adequacy standards and greater provisioning for such rapid credit expansions.30 
 
New Regulatory Frameworks 
 
Improvements in incentives and accounting frameworks will help, but they will not 
suffice.  Financial markets have been plagued with manias and bubbles that inevitably 
burst.  One can never be sure that one is in one a bubble until after it bursts—but as prices 
soar beyond historical ranges, the probability that one is in such a bubble increases.  For 
all the sophistication of modern risk management techniques, they have done little to 
affect the occurrence of these bubbles, perhaps as we learn how to manage risk better, we 
take more risks, and the new financial innovations have facilitated the ability to take on 
these additional risks. (Some argue that the use of modern risk management actually 
makes crises more frequent)  In the case of many of the new financial products, it was 
difficult to ascertain what their economic function, i.e. they were not really tailoring risk 
products to meet the particular risk profile of particular investors.  Indeed, what was 
going on was stripping assets apart and reassembling them, in ways that contributed to a 
lack of transparency?  It is clear that no one really understood fully the risk 
characteristics. These products, rather than helping individuals manage risks, made it 
more difficult.   
 
1. Financial products safety commission 
 
Financial markets have innovated, but these innovations have resulted in hundreds of 
thousands of loans that go beyond individuals’ ability to pay.  Even many those that are 
making their payments are facing hardship, anxiety, and stress.  Clearly, the financial 
                                                 
29 reference 
30 A proposal along these lines has been put forward by Charles Goodhart and Avinash Persaud, “A party 
pooper’s guide to financial stability,” Financial Times, June 5, p. 13.  They focus on the growth of 
individual bank assets.  Attention should also be directed at high growth rates of particular assets, e.g. home 
mortgages.     
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sector has not done a good job at analyzing the consequences of the products that they 
produce.  Defective products can clearly have disastrous effects both on those who buy 
them, and on our economy. 
 
In the current instance, those evaluating risk have made a number of systematic mistakes 
to which we have already called attention.31  
 
Earlier, I explained the problem of having private sector certification.  A financial 
products safety commission could help fill in the gap, particularly in relationship to 
products being produced by and invested in by regulated entities.  Each product would 
have to have a stated objective (e.g. in what ways was it helping manage and mitigate 
risk; what was the risk profile for whom the product was intended).  Its risk 
characteristics would be identified, using conservative models which paid due attention to 
the failures previously noted.  The Financial Products Safety commission would evaluate 
whether products provided significant risk mitigation benefits of the kind purported by 
the product.  There would be a presumption that there “is no free lunch,” i.e. that higher 
returns could only be obtained at the expense of greater risk; and a strong presumption 
against complex products, the full import of which are hard to analyze.   
 
The Financial Products Safety Commission would establish transparency standards that 
all those dealing with regulated financial entities would have to satisfy (including hedge 
funds and sovereign wealth funds.)  It would it have the power to ban certain products 
from the balance sheets of these regulated entities (just as there are currently restrictions 
on the assets that they can hold. 32  
 
These reforms are particularly important given the scope for regulatory arbitrage that has 
been exposed in the recent crisis.  Sub-prime mortgages were transformed, as if by 
financial alchemy, into AAA assets, so that they could be placed in fiduciaries who 
otherwise would not have been allowed to hold these risky products.  Limitations in our 
                                                 
31 To recap:  (a)  They have underestimated the importance of correlated risks.  They have failed to 
recognize the significant risk of a bubble (no one can be sure that there is a bubble until it breaks, but as 
prices rise in a historically unprecedented manner, surely the probability that there is a bubble should have 
increased, and analysts should have analyzed precisely the consequences—and informed those taking out 
these mortgages as well as those buying them.  There was a mathematical impossibility:  prices could not 
continue to rise and median incomes continue to fall, unless carrying costs fell in a totally unprecedented 
way.)   
(b)They failed to recognize that securitization increased the problems of information asymmetries, affecting 
incentives of those originating loans.  This should have been expected to adversely affect returns; but they 
failed to take account of this in their estimation of returns. 
(c) They failed to take account of systemic risks and fat tails.  “Once in a century events” have been 
occurring every ten years, and that fact itself should suggest that something is wrong with the models.   
 
These problems compounded, for instance, as they bought “insurance” against defaults.  But the insurance 
companies were not sufficiently capitalized to deal with systemic, correlated risks, the occurrence of which 
was far more likely that they recognized.   
32 Alternatively, it could impose restrictions, limiting purchases to a certain fraction of their portfolios—
though given the risk that can be hidden inside these products, any purchases should be viewed with care.    
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accounting system similarly provide scope for “accounting arbitrage.”  We understand 
better now some of the wrong motivations for the production of new financial products.   
 
 
2. Regulatory Instruments and the Financial Markets Stability Commission 
 
Not all the regulatory instruments that could have been used have been used to control 
the bubbles that have imposed such costs on the economy.  For instance, increasing 
collateral requirements (margin requirements, down payments) was a natural instrument 
to have employed, both in the stock bubble of the 90s and the housing bubble of today.  
The problem, noted earlier, is that the Fed (partly out of ideology) has been reluctant to 
use these instruments.   
 
In the current regulatory framework, the focus is mostly on individual institutions (is a 
particular bank “safe and sound”).  Little attention is placed on the overall framework. 
Financial markets have become increasingly interrelated.  One cannot look at the system 
focusing on banking alone, or on securities markets alone.  There is a need for a 
Commission that looks at the financial markets overall, and assesses whether the various 
regulatory agencies are doing what they should be doing to maintain financial market 
stability.  This Commission, like the Financial Products Safety Commission, should not 
be dominated by those from the financial markets, but should rather be more broadly 
representative, with, e.g. economists who take a broader systemic view, and reflect the 
concerns and views of main street and labor as well as financial markets.   
 
We noted earlier that regulatory authorities need to pay increased attention to indicia of 
crises (problems of “vulnerability”)33.  Earlier, we noted one of the factors is rapid 
expansion of credit.  Rapid expansions of credit into new markets (like the sub-prime 
market) should be the subject of increased regulatory scrutiny.  To be sure, we should 
encourage financial innovation—making credit available to those who previously did not 
have access can be a valuable social contribution.  But sometimes (perhaps often) there 
was a good reason that credit was not made available—there was a high risk of non-
repayment.  There is a need for balance and caution—encouragement for the creation of 
new products, but an awareness of the potential risks. 
 
Boundaries of regulation 
 
Government has a legitimate argument for imposing regulations on entities that threaten 
the stability of the financial system.  There has long been a view that investment banks do 
not need to be regulated, because their owners, and not the public, bears the risk if they 
make bad investment.  The government financed bail-out of Bear Stearns has laid to rest 
such claims.  The rationale for the government bail-out (as for the government 
                                                 
33 In the aftermath of the East Asia crisis, a literature developed trying to identify the factors that made a 
country more vulnerable. See, e.g. Jason Furman and J. E. Stiglitz  “Economic Crises: Evidence and 
Insights from East Asia,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998(2), pp. 1-114     and the studies 
cited there.  Interestingly, I suspect in terms of the factors identified there, it should have been apparent that 
the U.S. was highly vulnerable.   
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orchestrated bail-out of LTCM) was that there would be systemic consequences if a 
failure occurred.  This means that any entities that are closely interlinked with those parts 
of the financial system over which government has regulatory responsibility (banks, 
pension funds, other fiduciaries, etc) need to be regulated.  The extent and nature of the 
regulation should presumably depend on the nature of the systemic risks which problems 
in each entity (or from correlated behavior in a group of firms) might pose.   
 
Thus, one might argue that gambling between consenting adults should be allowed:  only 
the parties to the gamble are at risk.  On this reasoning, hedge funds that do not sell 
financial products to or receive loans from banks or other regulated entities should have 
at most limited regulations, e.g. certain behaviors might be proscribed.  Hedge funds (or 
similar entities) wishing, however, to sell financial products to or receive loans from 
banks would have to register as “qualified financial entities,” and be subject to more 





Each country, in designing its own regulatory framework, has a tendency to focus on 
impacts within its own country.  And just as each bank ignores the externalities to which 
its actions give rise, so too for individual countries.  For instance, some countries have 
expanded their banking system by regulatory competition, including weakening 
regulations designed to ensure compliance with the tax code.  There is a worry, noted 
earlier, that regulatory competition will result in a race to the bottom.  
 
The first best solution would entail coordination in the design of good regulatory 
standards.  The limitations of Basle II have already been noted.  If appropriate regulatory 
standards are not established, then it will be necessary for each country to design its own 
regulations to protect itself.  It cannot rely on regulations of others.  European banks’ 
losses from sub-prime mortgages now appear to be greater even than those of U.S. banks.    
 
It would be easy to enforce good standards, especially on those countries that have 
become noted for the role in evading regulations and taxes. There is little reason that so 
much financial activity occurs in many of these off-shore centers, except to avoid taxes 
and regulatory oversight; but this undermines the integrity of the global financial system.  
These off-shore centers survive only because we allow them, and there is no reason that 
this should continue.  America, for instance, has already shown that it can enforce its 
standards concerning financial relations with terrorists groups.  It could do so as well 
with those who are engaged more broadly in tax evasion, money laundering, or other 
such anti-social activities.  (The recent response of Germany and others to the tax evasion 
disclosures out of Lichtenstein highlight that much more can be done that has been done 
in the past.)  Similarly, restricting Regulated American or European financial entities in 
their dealings with financial institutions and other entities in jurisdictions that have filed 
to comply with OECD transparency standards or other regulatory standards that U.S. or 
Europe might agree upon,  and which did not cooperate in providing records of accounts 
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to tax authorities in the United States, would shortly either put these “rogue” financial 





The United States—and much of the rest of the world—is experiencing a major problem 
in its financial system.  As this paper is being completed, it is still not clear the extent of 
the global macro-economic consequences.  As we have noted, this is at least the third 
major problem involving America’s financial institutions in the last quarter century.  It is 
clear not only that they were not the font of wisdom in the management of risk that they 
purported to be, but that they did not even understand well the products that they were 
creating.  It is also clear that there will be many innocent victims of these failures—the 
consequences are not limited to the institutions themselves.  Taxpayers as a whole are 
now bearing risks as a result of the financial systems failure to manage its risks.   
 
Doctors learn a great deal from pathologies.  So too, economists should learn from the 
failures of the economic system.  We have attempted to provide a broad, theory-based 
diagnosis of what went wrong, and on the basis of that diagnosis, to prescribe remedies—
short term remedies that will minimize the depth and duration of the downturn and long 
term regulatory reforms that will reduce the frequency and depth of such occurrences in 
the future. We have looked for reforms that are consistent with other goals, such as 
promoting innovation, stabilizing the economy, and maintaining some semblance of 
equity.  Realism requires a recognition that even with our most valiant efforts, there will 
be crises in the future.  If we succeed in reducing the riskiness of the system, it will 
encourage market participants to take more risk.  Whatever regulatory system we devise, 
there will be those who will try to find weaknesses and exploit those weaknesses for their 
own gain, even if it imposes costs on others—and those in the financial markets will 
continue use their financial clout to induce the political processes to make “reforms” (as 
arguably they did in the repeal of Glass Steagall) that enhance their profits, at the expense 
of the well-being of society more generally.   
 
It is not easy to summarize the results of this analysis. The entire episode exemplifies 
many of the principles elucidated by the economics of information—yet many of the 
models explicitly or implicitly in the mind of both regulators and market participants 
ignored the imperfections and asymmetries of information, to which actions within the 
financial markets were contributing.  Incentives matter, but distorted incentives lead to 
distorted behavior.  Incentives at both the individual and organizational level were 
distorted.  Some of the recent actions taken to address the current problems have the 
potential of exacerbating these distortions in the future.     
